

Message Text

SECRET

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
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R 231253Z JAN 78
FM AMEMBASSY BONN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5063
INFO AMEMBASSY BERLIN
USMISSION USBERLIN
AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY SOFIA
AMEMBASSY WARSAW
USMISSION USNATO

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BONN 01222

EXDIS

NOFORN

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PGOV, PINS, GE, GW
SUBJECT: EVOLVING BONN SPECULATION ON GDR OPPOSITION
MANIFESTO

REFS: (A) BONN 0402 (B) BONN L003 (C) BERLIN 0236
(D) BERLIN 312

SUMMARY. THERE IS GROWING SPECULATION IN BONN TO THE
EFFECT THAT THE ALLEGED GDR OPPOSITION MANIFESTO
MAY REPRESENT AN ELEMENT IN A PUTATIVE SED POWER
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STRUGGLE MORE THAN A REFLECTION OF PARTY DISCONTENT.
THIS SPECULATION IS ACCOMPANIED BY THE NOTION THAT
THERE MAY HAVE BEEN SOVIET INVOLVEMENT, OR AT LEAST
INVOLVEMENT BY THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN EAST BERLIN.
ACCORDING TO THIS THEORY, THE MANIFESTO WAS PUBLISHED
IN ORDER TO PRODUCE PRESSURES THAT WILL REVERSE
HONECKER'S POLICIES OF INCREASING CONTACT BETWEEN

THE GDR AND THE FRG.

THOSE WHO SPECULATE IN THIS MANNER BELIEVE THAT THERE IS NO DESIRE ON THE PART OF THE SOVIETS OR OF THE GDR TO PROVOKE A CRISIS IN INNER-GERMAN RELATIONS, ALTHOUGH THEY MAY RECOGNIZE THAT SUCH A CRISIS MAY EVOLVE BY A PROCESS OF MUTUAL ESCALATION. THIS ANALYSIS, LIKE EARLIER GERMAN ANALYSES, IS BEING USED TO JUSTIFY A RELATIVELY CAUTIOUS FRG ATTITUDE TOWARD THE GDR REACTION TO THE MANIFESTO.

WHILE WE ARE NOT IN A POSITION TO EVALUATE THIS INFORMATION AS IT PERTAINS TO INTERNAL GDR MATTERS OR SOVIET-GDR RELATIONS, WE ARE REPORTING IT FOR ADDITION TO OTHERS' ANALYSIS. END SUMMARY.

1. BONN GOVERNMENT AND JOURNALIST CIRCLES ARE INCREASINGLY SPECULATING WITH THEORIES OF SOME SIGNIFICANT SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN THE PUBLICATION OF THE EAST GERMAN "MANIFESTO" IN SPIEGEL, AND SOME ARE ALSO MOVING TOWARD THE INTERPRETATION THAT THE MANIFESTO MAY REPRESENT AN ELEMENT IN A SED POWER STRUGGLE MORE THAN A MANIFESTATION OF PARTY DISCONTENT (THOUGH THEY STILL BELIEVE THAT SUCH DISCONTENT EXISTS.) SUCH ANALYSIS MAY BECOME MORE IMPORTANT AS TIME GOES ON AND IT APPEARS ALREADY TO BE INFLUENCING GERMAN ATTITUDES.

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2. A SENIOR OFFICIAL OF THE FRG INNER-GERMAN AFFAIRS MINISTRY HAS TOLD US THAT A SOVIET "JOURNALIST" WITH CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE CONNECTIONS TOLD HIM THAT "THIS INTERSHOP-SOCIALISM CANNOT BE TOLERATED."

3. A POLITICAL JOURNALIST WITH GOOD CONNECTIONS IN EAST BERLIN (AND THE SOURCE FOR OUR REPORT IN REF A), HAS ADDED THE FOLLOWING:

-- THE PRINCIPAL AUTHOR OF THE SECOND PART OF THE MANIFESTO (A STOPH SUPPORTER BY THE NAME OF VON BERG) WAS IN MOSCOW LAST WEEK AND MAY STILL BE THERE. THE JOURNALIST IS ABSOLUTELY CONFIDENT OF THIS.

-- STOPH HIMSELF IS ALSO NOW IN MOSCOW.

-- HE HAS HEARD REPORTS THAT PREPARATIONS ARE BEING MADE IN ROSTOCK (AND PERHAPS ELSEWHERE) FOR PRO-HONECKER DEMONSTRATIONS BY HONECKER'S FDJ SUPPORTERS.

(IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THIS JOURNALIST HAS A STRONG PERSONAL COMMITMENT TO FRG/GDR DETENTE, AND THUS MAY

NOT BE ENTIRELY IMPARTIAL. LIKE OTHER WEST GERMANS
WITH SUCH A BENT, HE WOULD FAVOR HONECKER.)

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5064
INFO AMEMBASSY BERLIN
USMISSION USBERLIN
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AMEMBASSY PARIS
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4. ACCORDING TO THE THEORY THAT IS BEING ADVANCED
BY THESE ANALYSTS AND OTHERS, ABRASIMOV
IS WORKING WITH STOPH TO USE THE MANIFESTO IN ORDER
TO TURN AROUND HONECKER'S POLICY OF GREATER CONTACT
WITH THE FRG. ACCORDING TO THIS THEORY, THE PURCHASE
OF THE VOLKSWAGON (GOLF) WAS THE LAST STRAW FOR
HONECKER'S OPPONENTS. THEY POINT TO THE FACT THAT
THE DEAL WAS NOT EVEN ANNOUNCED FOR SEVERAL DAYS BY
ADN AND WAS APPARENTLY DERIDED BY SED CADRES AS SIGNS
THAT THE AGREEMENT WAS CONTROVERSAL EVEN WITHIN THE
SED APPARATUS. THIS THEORY ALSO HOLDS THAT SOME
SOVIET AND SED OFFICIALS HAD BEEN OFFENDED BY THE
GREATER USE OF WEST GERMAN CURRENCY IN EAST GERMANY,
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WITH THE LAST STRAW IN THAT CONNECTION BEING THE REPORTED FACT THAT EAST GERMANS ARE NOW BEGINNING TO ESTABLISH ACCOUNTS IN EAST GERMAN BANKS WITH WEST D-MARKS. THE SOVIETS ARE, THUS, FACING A RETURN TO THE COMMON GERMAN CURRENCY.

5. THESE ANALYSTS ALSO BELIEVE THAT THEY SAW A SOVIET HAND BEHIND THE ENTRY DENIALS TO KOHL AND OTHER CDU OFFICIALS. THE OFFICIAL IN THE INNER-GERMAN MINISTRY, SUGGESTING THAT THE SOVIETS MAY WISH CONSULTATIONS OVER BERLIN, HAS TOLD US THAT HE BELIEVES ABRASIMOV HAS LONG WANTED TO WALK THE QUADRIPARTITE AGREEMENT BACK TO THE ORIGINAL SOVIET POSITION AND THAT ABRASIMOV MAY BE TAKING STEPS OF THIS KIND IN ORDER TO CREATE TENSIONS THAT CAN ONLY BE RELIEVED BY CONSULTATIONS.

6. ACCORDING TO THESE ANALYSTS, THE SED AND SOVIET OFFICIALS WHO MAY BE DIRECTING THIS CAMPAIGN ARE NOT INTERESTED IN DISRUPTING FRG-GDR RELATIONS ON A STATE BASIS AND ARE NOT INTERESTED IN CREATING A BERLIN CRISIS. THE OFFICIAL IN THE INNER-GERMAN AFFAIRS MINISTRY HAS TOLD US THAT GDR OFFICIALS AT THE GDR MISSION HERE ARE VERY ANXIOUS TO TELL EVERYBODY THAT THEY WANT NO CRISIS IN RELATIONS. THIS SAME WEST GERMAN OFFICIAL DOES NOT ATTACH ANY SIGNIFICANCE TO A RECENT EAST GERMAN TENDENCY TO DEMAND MORE OPENING OF SEALS ON TRUCKS PASSING THROUGH THE GDR. HE SAID THE INSTANCES OF THIS AMOUNT TO ABOUT 70 CASES OUT OF A MILLION VEHICLES PER MONTH AND CAN EASILY REPRESENT LEGITIMATE CONCERNS BECAUSE IT APPEARS THAT THE SEAL INSPECTION IN THE WEST IS SOMETIMES HANDLED IN A PERFUNCTORY MANNER.

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7. NONETHELESS, IT IS CLEAR THE FRG IS CONCERNED. ALTHOUGH CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT IN HIS SPEECH JANUARY L9 DOWNPLAYED ANY DANGER OF A GDR-FRG CONFRONTATION, THE POLITICAL JOURNALIST HAS TOLD US THAT SCHMIDT TRIED TO SEND WISCHNEWSKI TO EAST BERLIN TO PROTEST IN TIME SO THAT SCHMIDT COULD REFER TO IT DURING THE SPEECH, BUT THAT THE GDR DECLINED TO SEE WISCHNEWSKI. IT IS NOT CLEAR BY THIS ANALYSIS WHETHER THEY DECLINED BECAUSE THEY WISHED TO PURSUE

A TOUGH LINE OR THEY WERE UNCERTAIN WHAT TO SAY.

8. ACCORDING TO BOTH THE FRG OFFICIAL AND THE JOURNALIST, THE POST-MANIFESTO PLAY STILL HAS SOME TIME TO RUN. THE JOURNALIST SAID THAT A NEW DOCUMENT HAS NOW REACHED THE SPIEGEL AND THAT IT MIGHT BE PUBLISHED NEXT WEEK OR SOON THEREAFTER. HE ALSO SAID THAT A PROTEGE OF HONECKER'S, SEYFERT, WOULD BE EXPELLED TO THE WEST NEXT WEEK WITH HIS FAMILY (BUT HE OFFERED NO EXPLANATION WHAT THIS MEANT). THE OFFICIAL SAID THAT HIS MINISTRY IS RECEIVING REPORTS WHICH INDICATE THAT THE MANIFESTO HAS HAD A STRONG IMPACT IN THE GDR AND IS CAUSING UNCERTAINTY AT SOME LEVELS OF THE PARTY.

9. COMMENT: AS WE OBSERVED IN REF (A), WE ARE UNCERTAIN OF WHAT ALL THIS MEANS BUT ARE FORWARDING IT FOR ANALYSES AND POSSIBLE CONFIRMATION IF ANY CORROBORATING EVIDENCE EXISTS. WE WOULD WARN THAT THE BONN CIRCLE OF SOPHISTICATED GDR-WATCHERS REMAINS SMALL AND INBRED, SO THAT SOME OF THE STORIES MAY BE REINFORCING EACH OTHER AND GAINING ADDITIONAL CREDENCE BY REPETITION.

THE KEY POINT APPEARS TO BE THAT THE ANALYSIS IN SOME CIRCLES HERE, MORE PROBABLY THE SPD THAN THE
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FPD, IS SHIFTING SUBTLY BUT UNMISTAKINGLY TO THE

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USMISSION USBERLIN
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AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
AMEMBASSY ROME
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NOTION THAT THE KEY PART OF THE MANIFESTO (PART II) MAY NOT HAVE BEEN INTENDED AS A DOCUMENT AGAINST THE LEADERSHIP AS A WHOLE BUT AS AN INSTRUMENT FOR PURPOSES OF TOP-LEVEL JOCKEYING. EVERYBODY AGREES THAT THIS IS A DANGEROUS GAME NOT ONLY FOR THE SED BUT ALSO FOR THE SOVIETS, AND THEY REMARK THAT IT MAY REFLECT SOVIET FRUSTRATION ABOUT NOT BEING ABLE TO CONTROL HONECKER BY DIRECT MEANS.

IT SHOULD BE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT VAN WELL DID NOT MAKE SUCH AN ANALYSIS IN HIS MEETING WITH THE ALLIED AMBASSADORS ON JANUARY 19.

FROM THE STANDPOINT OF THE FRG THE ANALYSIS
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IS IMPORTANT BECAUSE IT REINFORCES THE TENDENCIES WITHIN THE FRG TO REACT WITH GREAT CAUTION NOT ONLY TO THE MANIFESTO BUT ALSO TO STIFFENING MEASURES THAT APPEAR TO BE EMERGING AS ITS CONSEQUENCE IN GDR-FRG RELATIONS. THAT REACTION IS BECOMING AN ELEMENT IN GERMAN DOMESTIC POLITICS (REF B) AND MAY BECOME DIFFICULT TO SUSTAIN. ON THE OTHER HAND, IT DOES SUGGEST THAT THE FRG WILL ATTEMPT TO AVOID THE KIND OF CONFRONTATIONS THAT WILL LEAD TO DIFFICULTIES IN AND AROUND BERLIN OR THE ACCESS ROUTES.

WE HAVE ON OTHER OCCASIONS SEEN A TENDENCY IN SOME FRG CIRCLES TO IMPUTE TO THE SOVIETS A DESIRE FOR CONSULTATION ON THE QUADRIPARTITE AGREEMENT, ALTHOUGH THERE IS NO OTHER EVIDENCE OF SUCH A DESIRE. BY THE SAME TOKEN, WE FIND IT HARD TO BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD HAVE PROMOTED A DOCUMENT WHICH -- IN PART I -- CONTAINS SUCH ANTI-RUSSIAN MATERIAL.

HOWEVER, WHAT IS IMPORTANT IS NOT WHAT WE THINK BUT
WHAT THE GERMANS MAY BE THINKING.

AFTER THE ABOVE WAS DRAFTED WE HEARD FROM AN
SPD-ORIENTED INTELLECTUAL THAT HE HAD SENT A PAPER
TO CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT MAKING SOME OF THE SAME POINTS
AS THOSE SPECULATED ABOVE (I.E., THE STOPH-HONECKER
CONFLICT AND SOVIET RESERVATIONS ABOUT HONECKER).
THEREFORE, WE CAN ASSUME THAT THIS LINE OF SPECULA-
TION HAS NOW REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF THE WEST
GERMAN GOVERNMENT. END COMMENT
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